Quakers recommend that, in our relations with each other, we should strive to respond to "that of God within everyone." In my own thinking, I have always related this to a supreme principle of respect. At least part of respect includes believing that everyone is capable of goodness. And at least part of the recommendation to look for and respond to "that of God" within everyone is also to assume that everyone is capable of goodness.
Immanuel Kant proposes something similar in his moral theory. One formulation of his "categorical imperative" is "Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means" (Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, 429, trans. James W. Ellington, Hackett Publishing Company, [1785] 1981).
For Kant, understanding people as "ends" is the same as understanding them as "rational agents." By this, he means that people set their own goals, and thus are sources of new activity in the world. Kant then connects human rationality to the concept of "goodness" in the following way. Ultimately, the "true function" of our rational nature "must be to produce a will which is not merely good as a means to some further end, but is good in itself" (396). He makes this comment on the heels of just having argued that rationality is not for the purpose of survival alone--instinct can and does aid in the survival of many other living organisms. Nor is the purpose of rationality to ensure happiness--it doesn't do a very good job at that! We cannot really plan for our own happiness (even if we do all desire it). So there is some other purpose for our having rationality: producing a will that is good in itself (that wills good for the sake of goodness alone).
When our will is thus purified, the goals that we set and the activity that results from our trying to fulfill these goals brings new goodness into the world. By treating people "as ends," we respect them as potential sources of new goodness for the world. And by "responding to that of God within everyone," we try, in our relations with others, to encourage them to bring that potential goodness forth.
The early Quakers believed that humans can reach a kind of perfection in life, and they too connected this notion with a kind of purification of will (see for example Barclay's Proposition VIII, in his Apology [1675/1678]). Barclay believed that it is an insult to God to think that God created us so badly that a kind of human perfection is impossible. He also worries that a doctrine that human perfectibility is impossible can make us all too willing to accept our shortcomings.
"What is the purpose of such a strange doctrine? The imperfection of Christians comes either from God or from themselves. If it is of their own doing, it must be because they fall short of using the power of obedience that was given them. In that case, they were capable of achieving God's will with his aid. But our opponents deny this, so they are not to be blamed for continuing in sin since they are incapable of doing otherwise" (Barclay's Apology in Modern English, edited by Dean Freiday, p. 158).
Barclay does not believe that reaching a kind of perfection makes us invulnerable to future sin or error. "If [those who have attained a measure of perfection] are not watchful they may fall into iniquity and lose it. Many good and holy men have had their ups and downs of this kind" but sin "does not destroy him altogether or make it impossible to rise again" (156). He goes on to argue that, "nevertheless a state can be attained in this life in which it becomes so natural to act righteously that a condition of stability is achieved in which sin is impossible" (157).
Do Quakers today still believe that this kind of perfectibility is possible?
Sunday, February 17, 2008
Tuesday, January 29, 2008
Quakers and Plato
I am under the impression that the early Friends were not sympathetic with the Cambridge Platonists, and I am wondering if anyone who reads this blog knows more about this.
I see lots of resonances between Plato's ideas and Quakerism.
For example, in Plato's Republic, Socrates argues that "it is never just to harm anyone" (335e).
Another example: the account of wisdom in the Republic is based on the sun analogy (506e-509d). Goodness is like the sun: it shines down the world offering illumination and warmth. The wise person sees not just what there is, but also perceives the play of light cast by the sun (goodness) upon what is. I interpret this to mean that the wise person is not merely knowledgeable about what there is and how it all works, but is also able to perceive or discern ebbs and flows of goodness in all that happens.
And I think that this is similar to the Quaker quest to look for that of God within everyone, and to live in a way that lends strength to the growth of goodness in the world. Isaac Penington writes about this in his letter to the Royal Society, where he argues that scientific knowledge alone (based on observation and reason) are not enough: attention to the spiritual dimension is important too. And Arthur Eddington, much later, writes about how science and religion are not at all at odds, because we have two modes of knowing: we perceive the world both in terms of what is, and what ought to be.
Both Penington and Eddington seem to be saying something similar to how Socrates defines wisdom. The best form of knowledge, wisdom, does not stop with just observing what is. We must also hone our ability to perceive the play of goodness over the world: to perceive what is in relation to what ought to be.
References:
Eddington, Arthur Stanley, Science and the Unseen World, 1929.
Penington, Isaac, Some Things Relating to Religion, Proposed in the Consideration of the Royal Society (So Termed), to wit, Concerning the Right Ground of Certainty Therein, 1668. Available in: The Works of Isaac Penington, Vol. III, Quaker Heritage Press, Glenside, PA, 1996.)
Plato's Republic (multiple translations and editions available).
I see lots of resonances between Plato's ideas and Quakerism.
For example, in Plato's Republic, Socrates argues that "it is never just to harm anyone" (335e).
Another example: the account of wisdom in the Republic is based on the sun analogy (506e-509d). Goodness is like the sun: it shines down the world offering illumination and warmth. The wise person sees not just what there is, but also perceives the play of light cast by the sun (goodness) upon what is. I interpret this to mean that the wise person is not merely knowledgeable about what there is and how it all works, but is also able to perceive or discern ebbs and flows of goodness in all that happens.
And I think that this is similar to the Quaker quest to look for that of God within everyone, and to live in a way that lends strength to the growth of goodness in the world. Isaac Penington writes about this in his letter to the Royal Society, where he argues that scientific knowledge alone (based on observation and reason) are not enough: attention to the spiritual dimension is important too. And Arthur Eddington, much later, writes about how science and religion are not at all at odds, because we have two modes of knowing: we perceive the world both in terms of what is, and what ought to be.
Both Penington and Eddington seem to be saying something similar to how Socrates defines wisdom. The best form of knowledge, wisdom, does not stop with just observing what is. We must also hone our ability to perceive the play of goodness over the world: to perceive what is in relation to what ought to be.
References:
Eddington, Arthur Stanley, Science and the Unseen World, 1929.
Penington, Isaac, Some Things Relating to Religion, Proposed in the Consideration of the Royal Society (So Termed), to wit, Concerning the Right Ground of Certainty Therein, 1668. Available in: The Works of Isaac Penington, Vol. III, Quaker Heritage Press, Glenside, PA, 1996.)
Plato's Republic (multiple translations and editions available).
Monday, January 21, 2008
Laying This Blog Down
I think it is time to recognize that it is time to lay this blog down. There hasn't been sufficient interest to continue it. I think it is better to make this as a conscious decision than it just let it happen through inertia. As Quakers we should let our yea be yea and our nay be nay. I wish the blog could have been more of a success but I must recognize that it is not. It is time to lay it down.
Friday, November 30, 2007
The Meaning of Life
I can't remember the exact quote but Iris Murdoch says something rather like this: any philosophical theory that you can't live isn't worth reading. Whatever the exact words; I heartily endorse the idea.
Contemporary philosophy, particularly the Analytic Philosophy in which I am trained, has become remote from life. It has become a series of intellectual puzzles to challenge refined intellectual tastes. It was not always so. In ancient times, particularly in the Hellenistic period, philosophy was viewed as medicine for the soul. It was the use of argument and reasoning deployed for the express purpose of curing the suffering of human life.
My question to my fellow Quaker philosophers is this: to what extent do you, in your teaching or your research, seek to address the problem of how to live. Do you see this as a proper part of philosophy or as something arrogant or juvenile (or both)?
This semester I added a few lectures on Hellenistic philosophy to my Introduction to Philosophy lectures and found that students related quite well to the issue of how we should live. Have any of you had similar experiences?
Contemporary philosophy, particularly the Analytic Philosophy in which I am trained, has become remote from life. It has become a series of intellectual puzzles to challenge refined intellectual tastes. It was not always so. In ancient times, particularly in the Hellenistic period, philosophy was viewed as medicine for the soul. It was the use of argument and reasoning deployed for the express purpose of curing the suffering of human life.
My question to my fellow Quaker philosophers is this: to what extent do you, in your teaching or your research, seek to address the problem of how to live. Do you see this as a proper part of philosophy or as something arrogant or juvenile (or both)?
This semester I added a few lectures on Hellenistic philosophy to my Introduction to Philosophy lectures and found that students related quite well to the issue of how we should live. Have any of you had similar experiences?
Wednesday, November 14, 2007
A Bigger Role for Philosophy in the Curriculum
Philosophy used to have a very big role in the college curriculum. The role has grown progressively smaller with each decade. I think we have been outmanoevered by other fields (mainly by the social sciences) in the game of academic politics. We should have a big role to play. How can we get it back?
In the standard American college curriculum today the English Department gets every student for at least one and usually for two required courses in composition. This means big English Departments. People in general recognize that the thinking skills of college students are poor. So a demand for critical thinking has arisen. But Philosophy has been outmaneovered here. As philosophers we understand clearly that good thinking requires a grounding in logic. You don't have to be able to do proofs in predicate logic with overlapping quantifiers, but if you don't see the difference between modus ponens and affirming the consequent you are in bad shape. Most college students are in bad shape. A simple practical applied logic course would do them a world of good. But instead on our campus we have every department claiming that they teach critical thinking already. The art department claims that they teach students to "think critically" when they teach them how to critique a work of art. Well, as valuable as that skill is, it isn't going to help people to see the fallacies in political speeches and editorials. You need a good solid grounding in logic for that and there is no substitute for it.
We ought to push our institutions to make Critical Thinking a required course for all students and the course should be 100% under the control of people with solid training in logic. This will require a huge shift of resources on campus and this amount of change is not easily accomodated by colleges. It's easier to "solve" the problem of lack of critical thinking skills by redefinition. "Critical Thinking" becomes whatever the Art School, Communications Department, Business SChool etc. want to call by that term. In other words change nothing in fact but rename what we are already doing. Real change requires a shift of resources. A whole army of new philosophers must be hired specifically to teach these courses and that means a gradual shift of resources away from other departments. But the shift does not have to be done overnight. It could most smoothly be accomplished in phases over a ten year period. Right now our Sociology Department mandates PHIL 1180 for its majors as their way of satisfying the humanity general education requirement. A gradual plan could target different years in which different departments made a equivalent shift in their graduation requirements. As the demand for Critical Thinking courses grew new philosophy positions could be added incrementally to handle the demand.
What do you think of my utopian vision?
In the standard American college curriculum today the English Department gets every student for at least one and usually for two required courses in composition. This means big English Departments. People in general recognize that the thinking skills of college students are poor. So a demand for critical thinking has arisen. But Philosophy has been outmaneovered here. As philosophers we understand clearly that good thinking requires a grounding in logic. You don't have to be able to do proofs in predicate logic with overlapping quantifiers, but if you don't see the difference between modus ponens and affirming the consequent you are in bad shape. Most college students are in bad shape. A simple practical applied logic course would do them a world of good. But instead on our campus we have every department claiming that they teach critical thinking already. The art department claims that they teach students to "think critically" when they teach them how to critique a work of art. Well, as valuable as that skill is, it isn't going to help people to see the fallacies in political speeches and editorials. You need a good solid grounding in logic for that and there is no substitute for it.
We ought to push our institutions to make Critical Thinking a required course for all students and the course should be 100% under the control of people with solid training in logic. This will require a huge shift of resources on campus and this amount of change is not easily accomodated by colleges. It's easier to "solve" the problem of lack of critical thinking skills by redefinition. "Critical Thinking" becomes whatever the Art School, Communications Department, Business SChool etc. want to call by that term. In other words change nothing in fact but rename what we are already doing. Real change requires a shift of resources. A whole army of new philosophers must be hired specifically to teach these courses and that means a gradual shift of resources away from other departments. But the shift does not have to be done overnight. It could most smoothly be accomplished in phases over a ten year period. Right now our Sociology Department mandates PHIL 1180 for its majors as their way of satisfying the humanity general education requirement. A gradual plan could target different years in which different departments made a equivalent shift in their graduation requirements. As the demand for Critical Thinking courses grew new philosophy positions could be added incrementally to handle the demand.
What do you think of my utopian vision?
Friday, November 2, 2007
Plain Speech in Action
I promised to be more regular in posting on this site. Here is a copy of the email I sent to our Provost after her visit with the philosophy department this week.
Dear Dr. Sheer,
Thank you for visiting us to share views about where ECU is going. I thought I’d take a few minutes to try to restate what some of us see as the problem with plans to turn ECU into a high-powered research institution. I speak only for myself and not for Umit and Rodney, though in some ways what I will be saying echoes their thoughts.
The quality of our students is quite a bit lower than that of students at most high-powered research institutions. As our discussion revealed there is no realistic prospect of raising ECU’s admissions standards to anything like Chapel Hill levels. In fact, as you point out, it will be a challenge not to lower them. So the kinds of students we have now are the kinds of students we will have for the next ten years and any rational plan must recognize that as a fact.
Being a high-powered research institution means asking faculty to spend more time doing research and less time teaching. No one should ignore the fact that more time for research means less time for teaching. The question is: is it wise or appropriate to continue to transfer faculty time and effort away from teaching? In high-powered research institutions typically a large proportion of the teaching is turned over to graduate students in order to free up the regular faculty for research. Another way faculty resources are freed up for research is by building and filling large lecture halls so that more students can be taught with less investment of faculty time. This standard operating procedure works tolerably well under two conditions: 1) the undergraduates are reasonably good students and can learn independently with little help from the faculty, 2) the graduate students doing the face-to-face teaching are of high quality.
Unfortunately at ECU neither of these conditions obtains. Our undergraduates are not independent learners and the students admitted to our graduate programs are of marginal quality as well. To move to the high-powered research institution model is, in my opinion, irresponsible. The result will be, and to some extent already is, educationally disastrous. There is plenty of talk among faculty about how those who once regularly assigned papers are now moving to multiple choice tests. Larger classes means that fewer faculty have attendance policies. The decline in educational quality is largely invisible but it is real and it is the result of administrative policies that promote research over teaching. I hope you will seriously consider resisting the drive to turn ECU into a research institution.
Thanks again for your time and attention,
Richard Miller
Associate ProfessorPhilosophy
Dear Dr. Sheer,
Thank you for visiting us to share views about where ECU is going. I thought I’d take a few minutes to try to restate what some of us see as the problem with plans to turn ECU into a high-powered research institution. I speak only for myself and not for Umit and Rodney, though in some ways what I will be saying echoes their thoughts.
The quality of our students is quite a bit lower than that of students at most high-powered research institutions. As our discussion revealed there is no realistic prospect of raising ECU’s admissions standards to anything like Chapel Hill levels. In fact, as you point out, it will be a challenge not to lower them. So the kinds of students we have now are the kinds of students we will have for the next ten years and any rational plan must recognize that as a fact.
Being a high-powered research institution means asking faculty to spend more time doing research and less time teaching. No one should ignore the fact that more time for research means less time for teaching. The question is: is it wise or appropriate to continue to transfer faculty time and effort away from teaching? In high-powered research institutions typically a large proportion of the teaching is turned over to graduate students in order to free up the regular faculty for research. Another way faculty resources are freed up for research is by building and filling large lecture halls so that more students can be taught with less investment of faculty time. This standard operating procedure works tolerably well under two conditions: 1) the undergraduates are reasonably good students and can learn independently with little help from the faculty, 2) the graduate students doing the face-to-face teaching are of high quality.
Unfortunately at ECU neither of these conditions obtains. Our undergraduates are not independent learners and the students admitted to our graduate programs are of marginal quality as well. To move to the high-powered research institution model is, in my opinion, irresponsible. The result will be, and to some extent already is, educationally disastrous. There is plenty of talk among faculty about how those who once regularly assigned papers are now moving to multiple choice tests. Larger classes means that fewer faculty have attendance policies. The decline in educational quality is largely invisible but it is real and it is the result of administrative policies that promote research over teaching. I hope you will seriously consider resisting the drive to turn ECU into a research institution.
Thanks again for your time and attention,
Richard Miller
Associate ProfessorPhilosophy
Wednesday, September 26, 2007
Philosophers' Roundtable again?
Dear fellow contributors to, and readers of, Q/P blog,
Recalling the surprising and encouraging level of interest in the Philosophers’ Roundtable at the recent FAHE conference at Earlham (which was the motivation for establishing this blog), and remembering the approaching (and early) due date for FAHE proposals this year (November 1st), I am wondering whether we should not be in the process of putting together a proposal for another Philosophers’ Roundtable at the upcoming FAHE conference at Woodbrooke. My suggestion - and I’m just floating something here, open to counter-proposals or revisions - is that we organize around a more focussed query this time (last year’s queries were great, but it turns out were far too extensive to even begin to discuss in the time we had), and invite three or four prepared responses (of a maximum of five minutes each, and from diverse philosophical perspectives - maybe from the more regular respondents to this blog?) that can serve as the stimulus to a broader ranging discussion for the rest of the session. The moderator should probably not be one of the presenters, so that the discussion that follows not be channelled to anyone’s response/interests in particular. Given the theme of the conference, perhaps our query could be: “In what ways does your Quaker faith impact upon your philosophical practice?” (There is a broader question implicit here, of course, as to how one’s Quaker faith impacts upon academic work in any discipline, so the discussion might be of interest to others too.) But I would be interested in what others would like to hear discussed as well. What do we all think?
Jeff Dudiak
Recalling the surprising and encouraging level of interest in the Philosophers’ Roundtable at the recent FAHE conference at Earlham (which was the motivation for establishing this blog), and remembering the approaching (and early) due date for FAHE proposals this year (November 1st), I am wondering whether we should not be in the process of putting together a proposal for another Philosophers’ Roundtable at the upcoming FAHE conference at Woodbrooke. My suggestion - and I’m just floating something here, open to counter-proposals or revisions - is that we organize around a more focussed query this time (last year’s queries were great, but it turns out were far too extensive to even begin to discuss in the time we had), and invite three or four prepared responses (of a maximum of five minutes each, and from diverse philosophical perspectives - maybe from the more regular respondents to this blog?) that can serve as the stimulus to a broader ranging discussion for the rest of the session. The moderator should probably not be one of the presenters, so that the discussion that follows not be channelled to anyone’s response/interests in particular. Given the theme of the conference, perhaps our query could be: “In what ways does your Quaker faith impact upon your philosophical practice?” (There is a broader question implicit here, of course, as to how one’s Quaker faith impacts upon academic work in any discipline, so the discussion might be of interest to others too.) But I would be interested in what others would like to hear discussed as well. What do we all think?
Jeff Dudiak
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